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In this thesis, we study whether the geographic proximity between institutional investors and firms 
affects the corporate governance characteristics of firms. Using indices that capture both a firm’s 
external and internal governance quality as well as five individual governance mechanisms, we 
show that – compared to nonlocal institutional investors – the presence of local investors weakens 
a firm’s internal governance but improves its external governance. The findings of this study offer 
important insights pertaining to the debate how investor proximity affects corporate governance 
quality. Specifically, they provide supporting evidence for the substitution theory that argues that 
internal and external governance are interchangeable – in this case with close-by investors making 
up for poorer internal governance. Finally, we investigate firms’ preference for corporate 
governance mechanisms based on both their ex-ante firm characteristics and the presence of local 
investors. Our results suggest that smaller, less liquid firms have weaker boards and fewer 
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1. Introduction 
 "Distant water cannot put out a nearby fire" is a Chinese proverb to express the feeling of 
powerlessness when the resources that could save the day are too far away. The proverb also 
appears to apply in the corporate governance arena when institutional investors and their portfolio 
firms are geographically distant. For example, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) suggest that firms with 
high local ownership exhibit better internal governance and higher firm performance. Relatedly, 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that local investors have an informational advantage, which 
helps their fund managers earn a 2.65% higher yearly return than they do on nonlocal investments. 
Indeed, according to the literature, having investors who are far away may be detrimental to 
various aspects of a firm’s well-being (Chen et al., 2007; Gaspar & Massa, 2007; Chhaochharia et 
al., 2012; Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Liu et al., 2018). As the separation of ownership and 
management becomes popular in large firms, the need to mitigate the principal-agent conflict 
between shareholders and CEOs increases. At the same time, the need for high quality corporate 
governance also rises.  
 Corporate governance is defined as a collection of mechanisms, processes, and structures, 
through which corporations are managed and operated. According to the literature, governance 
mechanisms are divided into two categories, external and internal. External governance includes 
laws and regulations, the labour market, and, most importantly, the market for corporate control 
that can cause poorly performing/poorly managed firms to be bought out. Internal governance 
applies to the internal controlling system, such as the control of the board of directors over the 
firms. The directors govern the firms through attending board meetings and voting for important 
decisions. For example, the board can vote to replace a CEO if he/she does not act in the best 
interest of the firm and its shareholders.  
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 Various scholars have studied the relationship between external and internal governance, and 
two theories are frequently put forward: the substitution and the complement theory. The 
substitution theory argues that external and internal governance do not exist independently but that 
they act as substitutes, which means that using improvements in one type of governance can lower 
the other. In contrast, the complement theory considers internal and external governance to be 
complements, which could result, e.g., in a strong board and applying less antitakeover 
mechanisms simultaneously.  
 Some literature studies the relationship between corporate governance and the local bias of 
institutions in investing, meaning that institutional investors prefer investing in local companies 
instead of the remote ones. Some of the scholars investigated the reasons behind this investment 
phenomenon. Ayers et al. (2011) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) suggest that by investing in 
local firms, institutions (e.g., banks, insurance companies, pensions, hedge funds, etc.) can acquire 
information at a lower cost. Researchers show that, using this information as an advantage, local 
ownership helps firms to make wise decisions in terms of increasing the firm value (Gaspar & 
Massa, 2007) and improve the effectiveness in the monitoring of the firms (Chhaochharia et al., 
2012; Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Liu et al., 2018).  
 We add to this literature by examining the impact of the distance between institutions and their 
portfolio firms on the firms’ external and internal corporate governance. Specifically, we study 
whether having local institutional investors affects the firms’ external and internal governance and 
whether there is any difference between them. In the end, we find that general and internal 
governance is weaker, while external governance is stronger when the firms and institutions are 
located closer to each other. Moreover, the results of the tests on individual governance 
mechanisms shows the same as the tests on governance indices. 
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 We also examine different firm characteristics to explore whether local investors affect 
governance differently based on the portfolio firms’ ex-ante characteristics. We find that larger 
and more liquid firms tend to have better boards and engage in more antitakeover tactics to deter 
hostile takeovers. 
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, We summarize the prior 
literature and propose our three hypotheses based on it. In section 3, we describe the data, the 
variables, and the models used in this paper. In section 4, we explain the results from the 
regressions. We explain the possible explanation for the results in section 5. Section 6 provides 
several robustness tests. Finally, we conclude in section 7. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Prior research 
A large amount of literature has discussed domestic securities’ preference in international 
portfolios and the bias towards local firms in domestic investments as the scholars observed a 
superior performance of local firms compares to non-locals on average. To explain this 
phenomenon, Huberman (2001) suggests that individual investors make local investments because 
of their familiarity with companies and the influence of local media, even if the investment 
conflicts with the theory of portfolio diversification. However, Barber & Odean (2008) 
demonstrate that unlike individuals, institutional investors are not interested in attention-grabbing 
stocks, e.g. stocks in the news, because the news is not a scarce resource for institutions as they 
have many other tools to select stocks. Others argue that the asymmetry information advantage is 
the reason toward local bias. For example, Coval & Moskowitz (1999) suggest that local 
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investments tend to be in small, nontraded, goods-producing and high leverage firms, and these 
results provide evidence to the existence of information asymmetries in local firms. Ayers et al. 
(2011) indicate that geographic intimacy between firms and institutional investors is often used as 
a proxy for the cost of acquiring monitoring information. Furthermore, Gaspar & Massa (2007) 
show that being geographically close to the firm is an inexpensive way to obtain information. 
Besides, Hamberg et al. (2013) present that after the compulsory International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption in Sweden, which caused uniform information, international ownership 
from countries that adopt the same standard increased. This result shows that bridging the 
information gap helps the nonlocal investors make investment decisions and reduces local bias. 
In this age of accelerating technology, the world is becoming smaller through electronical 
communication tools, and the information is widely available through social media and the internet. 
Because of this change, some scholars think that the benefit of being a local investor compared to 
a remote investor could be different from what was previously argued. Petersen & Rajan (2002) 
suggest that because of the greater credit availability induced by information technology, the 
distance between small firm lenders and borrowers is increasing. This change leads to a broader 
range of firms, especially those in the distance, can now receive funding and to an improvement 
in bank productivity. Bernile et al. (2016) find that the local information advantage declines after 
2000 because after turning into the new millennium, the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) were enacted for “leveling the playing field” and improving the 
disclosed information quality.  
Scholars who believe the information advantage still exists also document the usage of it. Hau 
(2001) finds evidence for a local institution’s high-frequency trading using information advantage. 
Kahn & Winton (1998) demonstrate that the institutional investors hold the information about the 
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firm to speculate or intervene and that a higher holding always increases the institution’s desire 
for intervention. Chen et al. (2007) do further examination, showing that independent long-term 
institutions focus on monitoring and influencing instead of trading for profit. Hermalin & 
Weisbach (2012) show that having an informed principal, i.e. shareholders, is not in the agent’s 
interest because the principals can use the information to make important decisions, including 
firing the agent. Focusing on mutual fund’s investors, Gaspar & Massa (2007) show that local 
ownership improves the monitoring and stimulates value-enhancing decisions. Moreover, the 
firms with higher local ownership would improve governance and be more profitable, which leads 
to local investors being regarded as effective monitors (Chhaochharia et al., 2012; Coval & 
Moskowitz, 2001; Liu et al., 2018).   
Questions about the types of information provided and their influence on local investors fuel 
some debates. Coval & Moskowitz (2001) and Ivković & Weisbenner (2005) claim that both 
individuals and institutions gain excess returns on local stocks by using local private information. 
Simultaneously, many studies show that local social networks also make it easier for local 
investors to access “soft information” (e.g. knowledge-based assets, company culture and CEO’s 
managerial ability) from local managers. Wrigley et al. (2003) argue that the institutions tend to 
gain knowledge spillovers in the local business networks where they can build relationships with 
corporate elites. Chhaochharia et al. (2012) believe that this information causes corporate 
governance to be affected by local investors because Fracassi (2017) shows that social peers are 
influential to managers in making corporate policy decisions.  
Because of the power-sharing relationship between shareholders and managers and the rise of 
hostile takeover offers, managers try to reserve power from shareholders through adopting 
governance provisions, such as bylaw and charter amendment limitations, that restrict shareholders’ 
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rights (Gompers et al., 2003). At the same time, shareholders also fight to align the managers’ 
interests with shareholders’ by executive compensation etc. Using a self-constructed governance 
index, including 24 different governance provisions, Gompers et al. (2003) claim that firms with 
better corporate governance have better operating performance. Bhagat & Bolton (2008) also find 
that there is a significant relationship between better governance and better concurrent and 
subsequent firm performance. From the perspective of boards of directors, Hermalin & Weisbach 
(1998) show that the monitoring of the CEO is weaker when the CEO is entrenched by making 
themselves costly to replace. They run away from the internal and external governance 
mechanisms that can limit their power to entrench themselves. Consequently, it is hard for the 
board to identify problematic CEOs, which may decrease the firm value. 
Some scholars further study the classification of governance mechanisms and different 
associations between them. For example, Jensen (1993) classifies control forces operating on a 
corporation into four categories: capital markets, legal/political/regulatory system, product and 
factor markets, and internal control system headed by the board of directors. Huson et al. (2001) 
and Weir et al. (2002) discuss that internal monitoring mechanism, including boards of directors 
and blockholders, and external mechanism, such as the market, are two ways to solve the agency 
problem.  
For the role of internal and external governance mechanisms, there are two strands of theories. 
The first one argues that internal and external mechanisms are complements, which is explained 
in Shleifer & Vishny (1986) and Cremers & Nair (2005). They show, among other things, that 
large shareholders, as an internal governance mechanism, play an important role in takeovers 
because the takeover can hardly happen in firms that have no large shareholders, even without 
antitakeover provisions. Other researchers (Hadlock & Lumer, 1997; Mikkelson & Partch, 1997) 
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further support this complement theory by showing that CEO turnover decreases, indicating weak 
internal governance, in environments where there is less threat of takeover, which means the 
external governance is weak. The second theory argues that external and internal governance are 
substitutes. Gillan et al. (2011) find that a powerful board can substitute the market for corporate 
control. They show that firms with stronger boards have more external governance provisions. 
Contrarily, firms whose boards are less powerful have fewer provisions, meaning the market for 
corporate control is playing a stronger monitoring role there. Guo et al. (2015) provide further 
evidence to the substitution theory by using the firms who comply with the NYSE and NASDAQ 
listing requirements of a majority of independent directors as an exogenous shock to study the 
exposure to the external governance mechanisms. They also document that boards and institutional 
investors are more effective at monitoring. However, Weir et al.(2002) believe that the market for 
corporate control is a key mechanism, and they also believe that it is a substitue for other 
governance mechanisms using a sample of UK listed companies.  
The work of Gompers et al. (2003) has pioneered the discussion around the different methods 
to measure corporate governance and started an ongoing and significant academic conversation 
about corporate governance. Using a different period, methodology, and larger governance 
database of institutional investors than Gompers et al. (2003), Brown & Caylor (2006) investigate 
the relationship between firm value and the 51 ISS governance measures. They provide a firm-
specific Gov-7 index by identifying seven critical drivers to the relationship out of fifty-one 
measures. Aggarwal & Williamson (2006) have created a GOV64 Index, which is based on 64 ISS 
corporate governance standards. To be adaptable to both U.S firms and international firms, 
Aggarwal et al. have computed a GOV index using 44 measures on ISS in a further study (2009).  
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To investigate how internal and external governance mechanisms affect equity price, Cremers 
& Nair, (2005) use institutional blockholder ownership and public pension fund ownership to 
capture the internal governance mechanism. Byun et al. (2012) use an internal corporate 
governance index provided by a quasi-government organization, including the board of directors 
and four other factors. Unfortunately, the index only includes Korean companies on the KSE, but 
not the U.S companies, which we study in this thesis. Gao & Jia (2016) use seven variables as 
proxies of internal monitoring: board size, board independence, the percentage of more than four 
directorships, insider ownership, CEO duality, and two variables about the audit committee. 
Likewise, Bushee et al. (2014) construct a board characteristics index containing five similar 
variables as in (Gao & Jia, 2016).  
In this thesis, we use one general governance index which is the GIM Index (P. Gompers et 
al., 2003), two external governance indices, which are the Alternative Takeover Index (Cremers 
& Nair, 2005) and the Entrenchment Index (L. Bebchuk et al., 2009), and one internal index, the 
Board Characteristics (Bushee et al., 2014). Section 3.3. provides descriptions of these indices. 
 
2.2 Testable hypotheses 
According to the literature discussed previously, geographic proximity can be an essential 
way to mitigate the asymmetry information, which means that institutions that are geographically 
closer to firms will get more information about the firm’s actual operation. Using this information, 
the local institutions can thereby better monitor the firm. Following a few articles (Huson et al., 
2001; Weir et al., 2002; Cremers & NAIR, 2005; Bushee et al., 2014), we divide corporate 
governance into two groups, internal and external governance, and we expect both of them to be 
stronger in the firms who have local institutional investors. Hence, my first hypothesis is as follows: 
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H1. Local institutional investors monitor firms better, leading to less managerial entrenchment. 
Specifically, the closer institutions are to the firms, the more influential the market for corporate 
control will be and the stronger the board will be.  
H1.1 Firms with local investors apply fewer anti-takeover measures, and their boards will have 
higher quality, e.g. better board independence, less staggered boards, smaller board size, fewer 
dual CEO/chairman positions, and a lesser likelihood of dual-class stock. 
 Further, we focus on different firm characteristics and examine the impact of local institutional 
investors on corporate governance in different kinds of firms. As per the literature, we postulate 
this second hypothesis:  
H2.  The firms have better corporate governance in the presence of local investors when they are 
larger, and when they have higher sales growth rate, higher cash ratio, and higher blockholder 
ownership, lower firm age and higher firm risk.  
We also want to examine the relationship between internal and external governance 
mechanisms in the condition of having the mean distance of the three biggest institutions in the 
proximity of the firms. Based on prior studies, we present the following competing alternative 
hypothesis: 
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We collect U.S data from January 1993 to December 2014 and get 79,924 firm-year 
observations from Thomson Reuters for firms and institutional investors’ geographic data. After 
merging with the Governance variables, which are available on the Institutional Shareholder 




We estimate the equally weighted average distance between the three biggest institutional 
investors and the firms as the indicator for geographic proximity (in hundreds of miles). Then, we 
generate a local dummy, which equals one if it is the first quintile of the distance, and zero if it is 
the fifth quintile.  
We divide the governance indices into three groups. The first group is the general governance 
index GIM Index. The second group is the external governance index, which includes two indices 
that are focused on Entrenchment (EI) and Anti-takeover (AI). The third group is the internal 
governance index, denoted as Board Characteristics. It explains the extent to which directors 
monitor managers through the internal mechanism. The GIM Index is developed by Gompers et 
al. (2003), using the occurrence of 24 governance provisions for measuring the power balance 
between shareholders and managers. This governance index is sometimes used in the literature as 
a general measure of shareholder rights. Hellwig (2000) discusses that it includes protection for 
directors and managers (golden parachutes) and that effective voting power of shareholders 
(absence of confidential voting) indicates the bargaining ability of the managers compared to 
inside monitors. This index is also used as an antitakeover index (Cremers & NAIR, 2005). Hence, 
we use it as a broad index to denote corporate governance in a wide range. The GIM Index is only 
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available until 2006 on the ISS database. For this issue, we follow Li & Li (2018) to extend our 
sample until the end of 2014 as the GIM Index is regarded as “fairly stable”.  
Another index we use is from the Alternative Takeover Index (ATI), created by Cremers & 
Nair (2005). The ATI focuses on narrow and key antitakeover provisions: staggered boards, poison 
pill, and restrictions on shareholder voting to call for special meetings or act through written 
consent. Since ATI is one point less here when a takeover provision is added, we do a linear 
transformation of ATI, AI (Antitakeover Index) =3-ATI, to be consistent with the GIM index and 
for ease in exposition.  
The third index is the Entrenchment Index, constructed by Bebchuk et al. (2009), which takes 
the top six percent of shareholders’ opposition to the 24 provisions included in the GIM Index. 
The six provisions, including classified board, poison pills, golden parachutes, supermajority 
provisions, limits on charter amendments, and limits on bylaw amendments, compose the 
Entrenchment Index. The creators of the Entrenchment Index also find that these provisions 
are negatively correlated with firm performance.  
The internal governance index, called the Board Characteristics (Bushee et al., 2014), consists 
of board size, percentage of independent directors, whether the CEO/chairman duality, presence 
of board interlocks, and board meeting attendance (equals one if any director is absent for more 
than 75% of the board meetings). According to this paper, we group board size and board 
independence of a firm based on k-means cluster analysis. This index combines the internal 
governance mechanisms for monitoring managers.  
All the indices mentioned above are created by adding one point when a specific defensive 
provision is adopted by the firm, indicating the degree of corporate governance of the firm. In 
other words, if the index is larger, the general governance (GIM) is worse, antitakeover measures 
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are increasingly adopted (AI), managers are more entrenched (EI), and the board is inadequate in 
monitoring the firm (Board Characteristics). 
Besides using indices, we also study the individual governance mechanisms that have been 
most studied in the literature following the findings of Aggarwal et al. (2011) to have a closer look 
at how the geographic proximity affects corporate governance. Due to limited data access, we 
adopt five out of the seven attributes: board independence, board size, CEO/ chairman duality, the 
existence of a staggered board, and the existence of multiple share classes. Each one of these five 
provisions has much literature to back up its correlation to corporate governance. Brickley et al. 
(1994) report that independent directors serve the interests of shareholders. Jensen (1993) shows 
that a smaller board can perform more efficiently and monitor the CEO more effectively. Under 
the agency theory, which believes that CEO duality entrenches managers more and thus hampers 
the board monitoring effectiveness, the existence of duality is associated with poor governance 
and bad firm performance (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Duru et al., 2016; Aktas et al., 2019). 
Bebchuk et al. (2002) demonstrate, using 1996-2000 data, that an effective staggered board is a 
strong antitakeover force by showing that not a single hostile bid succeeded in firms with a 
classified board. Another effective governance mechanism is the dual-class structure. It separates 
the cash-flow rights and voting rights of shareholders and provides insiders with more voting rights 
while holding disproportional shares.  Gompers et al. (2010) find that firm value is positively 
correlated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively correlated with insiders’ voting rights. 
For the calculation of these five variables, we define board size as the number of directors on the 
board, and board independence as the percentage of independent directors. The last three variables 
are dummy variables, which equal one if the provision exists.  
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Following previous research, we control for blockholder ownership, which is the stock 
ownership of the institutional investors whose holdings are more than 5% since blockholders are 
active shareholders. Cremers & Nair (2005) believe blockholder ownership affect corporate 
governance. Besides, several firm characteristics, such as Cash Ratio, Firm Size (log (Total Asset), 
million), Sales Growth Ratio, Firm Age and Firm Risk (Annualized Volatility) are used to control 
possible effect to corporate governance. In section 4, we do Propensity Score Matching using 
Return on Asset (ROA), Market to Book Ratio (MB), Fixed Asset Ratio, Leverage Ratio, and the 
high Bankruptcy Rate (Bad Z-score). Therefore, we include these variables as control variables 
when PSM is not applied. For the calculation of z-score, we follow the model proposed by Altman 
(1968) and identify Bad Z-score dummy equals to one if z-score is less than 1.81 and zero 
otherwise. We also control year and industry dummies in all the models. 
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 provides an overview of the sample by year. There is no obvious change in distance 
between the institutional investors and the firms from 1993 to 2014. Except for the Entrenchment 
Index, which increases after 2006, the Antitakeover Index and Board Characteristics are gradually 
decreasing, while the GIM Index is generally stable. For individual mechanisms, Board 
Independence jumped from 0.5 in 1995 to 0.8 in 2014, and the existence of the Staggered Board 
is comparatively less in recent years, showing an improvement of corporate governance over the 
years. The firms are becoming larger and having a lower fixed asset ratio compared to the early 
years of the sample. The descriptive statistics of the variables we use are reported in Table 2. We 
winsorize on all the continuous variables, including the geographic distance before classifying it 
as a local dummy and dependent variables such as board independence.  
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We provide mean and median equality tests for variables between local and non-local 
investment in Table 3. Three out of the four indices as well as all the individual mechanisms, 
except for Board Independence, are significantly different at the 1% significance level between 
the two groups. More specifically, the indices are higher, which means that local firms are less 
governed both internally and externally compared to non-local firms. On average, local firms have 
one more director on the board than non-local firms. A large board is considered as less efficient 
and less effective in monitoring the firms than a small board since it is harder to reach an agreement 
with more people involved (Jensen, 1993). Besides, the possibility to adopt CEO/Chairman duality 
is 5% higher for local firms than non-locals, and the incidence of the staggered board and dual-
class structure is 10% higher. Through adopting these provisions, CEOs can entrench themselves 
better and restrict the shareholders rights to vote and to remove directors. The results are 
contradictory to Hypothesis 1, which stipulates that the local firms would be better monitored. 
Before going into a more in-depth analysis, we test the Pearson correlation between the 
variables. The correlation matrix is provided in Table 4. Except for board independence, all 
governance variables are negatively correlated with distance, indicating that the closer the 
investors are to the firms, the worse the firms are monitored. We do not find any strong correlation 
between the distance and other control variables, so there are no multicollinearity concerns. 
 
3.4 Regression Model 
To test Hypothesis 1, we do a series of regression on the local dummy, using different 
governance dependent variables and including year- and industry-fixed effects. We measure the 
dependent variable at time t, independent variables and control variables at time t-1 because the 
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explanatory variables will only impact corporate governance after the annual financial information 
is disclosed to the shareholders. We then estimate the basic regression as follows: 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the four governance indices and two continuous individual mechanisms, board 
independence and board size. Local is the dummy variable that equals one if the mean of the 
distance between firms and its top three institutional investors is the first quintile of all the distance, 
and zero if it is the fifth quintile. Control variables are chosen based on prior, relevant studies. 
Year and two-digit SIC-code industry-fixed effects are adopted for controlling macroeconomics 
influence and differences among different industries.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡            (1) 
For the three individual governance dummy variables CEO/chairman duality, staggered board, 
and dual-class, we run the logit regression model, keeping other factors the same: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑦)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡    (2) 
Next, we reinforce the model by performing a propensity score matching analysis on local and 
non-local samples to alleviate possible endogeneity concerns in the underlying firm characteristics. 
This approach enables the clustering of a group of similar firms that expect proximity between the 
firms and the institutions. The firms with local institutions are grouped into the treated group. In 
contrast, those with non-local institutions are assigned to the control group. If there is a significant 
relationship between the local dummy and the governance mechanisms, we can conclude that the 
results are convincing.  
Many financial characteristic dimensions are commonly used in propensity score matching 
analysis to control firm effects (Aggarwal et al., 2007; Ivashina et al., 2009), and we use them too. 
These characteristics are ROA, Market to Book ratio, Asset structure (PPE), Leverage, and with 
and without Bad z-score. Following the model in (Altman, 1968), we calculate z-score as: 
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z=12*(Working capital/Total assets) + 1.4*(Retained earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3*(EBIT/Total 
Assets) + 0.6*(Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities) + 1.0*(Sales/Total assets). 
We assign a bad z-score dummy variable that equals one if z-score<1.81 and zero otherwise. Next, 
we do the nearest neighbourhood matching using caliper of 0.1 (Ivashina et al., 2009). To improve 
matching efficiency, we allow ties option in STATA. According to Rosenbaum & Rubin (1985), 
the matching is regarded as effective when bias is less than 20%. In the untabulated matching, all 
matching bias is less than 10%, and most of it is less than 5%. Hence, we consider the matching 
to be effective. Afterwards, we redo the OLS and Logit regression using only the matched samples 
in treated and control groups this time.  
To further examine how local investors’ presence affects the relationship between firm 
characteristics and corporate governance (Hypothesis 2), we add interaction terms of the local 
dummy and block ownership, cash ratio, firm size, sales growth ratio, firm age, and firm risk. 
Keeping all other variables the same as in models (1) and (2), we obtain the following regressions: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                 (3) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑦)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛿𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                               (4) 
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4. Empirical Results 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the test results for Hypotheses 1 & 2. More specifically, in the two 
tables, the odd columns belong to the first hypothesis, and the even columns belong to the second 
hypothesis. The test results in the odd columns of Table 5 demonstrate that the coefficients of three 
out of four governance indices are significantly positive, except for the Antitakeover Index, which 
is not significant at zero. This result indicates that the firms with local investors have more 
entrenchment mechanisms and weaker boards at work since the higher the indices are, the worse 
the external and internal governance is. The same results are found in Table 6. They show that if 
the mean distance between the biggest three institutional investors and a firm is comparatively 
shorter, the firm is less independent, the board is larger, and the likelihood of having a staggered 
board and dual-class structure is higher. These results are all at least significant at the 1% 
significance level. However, these outcomes are somewhat surprising because they contradict the 
hypotheses.  
To exclude firm effects, we use a propensity score matching procedure to match firms with 
comparable financial characteristic dimensions. By removing the control variables used to match 
firms and using merely the matched samples, we regress again, with the other variables staying 
the same as before. The results are reported in the odd columns of Tables 7 and 8. CEO duality 
becomes significantly positive and all the other results keep the same as the non-matched samples 
in Tables 5 and 6. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 1, which postulates that local institutional 
investors can help to monitor firms. Contrarily, the results illustrate that when the institutions are 
close to the firms, the firms are less monitored. 
To discern the true relationship between corporate governance and the geographic proximity 
of a firm to its institutions, we use Models 3 and 4 including interaction terms of the local dummy 
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with blockholder ownership, cash ratio, firm size, sales growth ratio, firm age, and firm risk on top 
of Models 1 and 2. The results of unmatched samples appear in the even columns of Tables 5 and 
6, while the matched results appear in the even columns of Tables 7 and 8.  
In Table 5, comparing to the results of Model 1, the estimates of the local dummy in Model 3, 
changed from insignificant to significantly negative at the 5% level for the Antitakeover index and 
from significantly positive to insignificant for the Entrenchment index. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms provide more evidence on the relationship between local dummy and governance 
in different firms. For example, when the firms are in proximity of their institutional investors, the 
results show that the higher the cash ratio, the more antitakeover and entrenchment provisions are 
implemented. Blockholder ownership plays a vital role in the GIM index because an increase in 
block ownership is associated with a 1.1391 decrease in provision use if the local dummy equals 
one. Comparing the even columns to the odd columns in Table 6, the coefficient of staggered board 
loses its significance while showing a statistically significant relationship with cash ratio 
interaction terms. 
After the PSM procedure, the results of Models 3 and 4 using the matched samples in Tables 
7 are 8 are consistent with Tables 5 and 6. Compare Model 3 with Model 1 in Table 7, the 
coefficient of the Antitakeover Index becomes negatively significant, having significant positive 
coefficients on cash ratio interaction term and size interaction term at the 1% level. In summary, 
these findings demonstrate that when firms have local institutional investors, governance is weaker 
in all the levels, but the external governance is stronger when the firm characteristics are included 
in the model.  
 
                         
1
 When local dummy equals 1 and when Blockholder ownership increases by 1%, an increase of 1.603+(-2.742) =-1.139 will be 
in the GIM index. 
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5.  Local Institutions and the Governance of Firms 
In Table 7, the significant negative coefficient on the Antitakeover Index demonstrates that 
when investors are located locally, they will adopt fewer anti-takeover defence provisions. The 
coefficient of the internal governance, on the other hand, is positive at the 1% significant level, 
which shows that the board is weaker when the firms and institutions are close. This positive 
correlation with internal governance is consistent with the result of the Board Independence in 
Table 8. On the other hand, staggered board has a significantly negative coefficient which is 
coherent with the coefficient of Antitakeover Index, because staggered board is acknowledged as 
an anti-takeover provision, and it is also the only one, out of the five individual variables, as a 
component in the external indices. Overall, the results reveal that when the institutions are close 
to the firms, the board is less independent, and classified board structure is less likely to happen. 
These results show that the firms with local institutions, have better external governance, but worse 
internal governance. 
When it comes to Hypothesis 2, which claims that some firm characteristics (size, sales growth 
rate, cash ratio, blockholder ownership, firm age, and firm risk) affect the corporate governance of 
local institutions (even columns in Table 7), the results continually indicate opposite effects to 
external indices and internal index. For example, the coefficients of cash ratio interaction term on 
the two external indices are significantly positive, but the coefficient is negative on the internal 
index. Similarly, the coefficients of size interaction term are opposite on external and internal 
indices. These results show that local institutional investors’ presence improves internal 
governance (stronger boards), but deteriorate external governance (more governance provisions) 
when the firms are larger and when their cash ratio is higher.  
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With the finding that remotely located firms accumulate cash to increase their private benefits, 
Boubaker et al. (2015) acknowledge that there are bigger agency conflicts, and it is less effective 
to monitor those firms because of the lower observability of managerial actions due to the 
remoteness. Gaspar & Massa (2007) and Kahn & Winton (1998) report that local ownership has a 
positive impact on governance and that larger firms intervene more because the cost of acquiring 
information is lower. Based on our results, which are the positive effect on internal governance 
and adverse effect on external governance for large local firms and high-cash-ratio local firms, we 
believe the findings of information asymmetry in these two articles apply to internal governance, 
not external governance.  
The results of individual mechanisms in even columns of Table 8 also provide backup results 
for the adverse effects of local firm characteristics to internal and external governance. The results 
show that when the local firms are large, the boards of these firms are smaller and more 
independent, but the local firms are more likely to have a classified board. Similarly, local firms 
with higher cash ratios have less possibility of having a CEO as a board chair but present a higher 
chance of having a staggered board. As mentioned earlier, except for staggered board, which is an 
anti-takeover provision to protect the firms from unwanted external acquisitions, all the other four 
mechanisms (board independent, board size, CEO duality and dual-class) are internal governance 
mechanisms. This classification can explain why most of the coefficients of the staggered board 
and the external index go in the same direction, while the other four individual provisions and the 
internal index go in the opposite direction. 
Because large shareholders are believed to be active and effective monitors to the managers 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), Berger et al. (1997) assign a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
has more than one blockholder, when investigating the relationship between managerial 
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entrenchment and capital structure. They use this dummy as an inverse measure of managerial 
entrenchment. In column (2) of Table 7, the coefficient of the interaction term of blockholder 
ownership is significantly negative on the GIM index, while others remain insignificant.  
In summary, the results in Table 7 & 8 partially demonstrate that Hypothesis 2 is correct: with 
local investors, firms have better internal governance, but worse external governance when they 
are larger in size and have a higher cash ratio. Additionally, firms possess a lower chance of having 
classified boards with a higher blockholder ownership.  
Finally, we turn to the analysis of Hypothesis 3, which explores the relationship between 
external and internal governance mechanisms. Hadlock & Lumer (1997) and Mikkelson & Partch 
(1997) suggest that internal and external governance mechanisms are complements, while others 
(Gillan et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2015) argue that external and internal governance are substitutes. 
We run a regression of the GIM index and external indices on internal index board characteristics 
in Table 9. Before adding the interaction term of board characteristics and local dummy, the result 
shows no relationship between external and internal governance. When we include the interaction 
term, although the coefficients are positively significant on the Entrenchment index, the impact of 
board characteristics is very close to zero when the local dummy equals one (0.011 on EI)2. 
Moreover, when the institutions are far from the firms, there is no significant relationship between 
internal and external governance. Considering the results in Tables 7 and 8, we believe a 
substitution relationship exists between internal and external governance. Specifically, firms with 
local investors have better external governance and weaker internal governance. At the same time, 
if the firms are large and have a high cash ratio, they will strengthen the board of council and allow 
less anti-takeover provisions. 
                         
2
  When local dummy equals 1 and when Board Characteristics increases by 1, a change of -0.047+0.058 =0.011 will be on the 
EI. 
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The result that the boards are weaker when the institutions are close to the firms seems to be 
counterintuitive. Yes, as some scholars have discussed (Cai et al., 2016; Chhaochharia et al., 2012; 
Wrigley et al., 2003), being geographically closer to the firms enables the fund managers of 
institutions  to build a personal relationship with the firm executives and officials. Such a situation 
lowers the cost of acquiring information and bridges the gap of information asymmetry. As a result, 
institutions are more likely to learn about the underlying events or changes happening in the firms 
through their local community, thereby influencing the firms’ decisions through networking and 
personal connection. It makes being active on the board not that necessary, which leads to a weaker 




6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Endogeneity concerns  
In the corporate governance area, endogeneity is always a key point that requires attention. 
We perform a logit regression of local dummy on the governance indices. The results are presented 
in Table 10. The significant coefficients show that there is a possible causality issue in the model. 
To exclude this issue and omit variable concern, we use two stage-least squares (2SLS) and 
instrumental variables (IV). Although Gaspar & Massa (2007) state that proximity is reasonably 
exogenous, Boubaker et al. (2015) and Huang & Kang (2017) show that from the perspective of 
information advantage, remoteness from metropolitan cities also plays an important role in getting 
access to information. Moreover, Cai et al. (2016) present that besides proximity, the urban 
location of firms also plays a vital role in monitoring because soft information in 
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M&A transactions are hard to codify and transmit. Hence, following previous research (Ayers et 
al., 2011; Gaspar & Massa, 2007; Mazur et al., 2018), we use the metropolitan dummy which 
equals one if the firm is located in the 25 biggest metropolitan cities in the States, and the remote 
dummy for a firm located more than 250 km away from any of the 25 cities as the instrumental 
variables. 
The results are shown in Table 11. Regressions (1), (3), (5), and (7) present the estimated local 
dummy from first-stage regression using the two instrumental variables. Regressions (2), (4), (6), 
and (8) show the results from the second-stage regressions of the governance indices on the 
estimated local dummy. The control variables are the same as those in the regressions in Table 7. 
We also perform a Wu-Hausman test on the regressions for an endogenous check. The null 
hypothesis is that the local dummy is exogenous. The results in the last row of Table 11 show that 
all the p-values are higher than 10%, which means that there is no endogeneity concern.  
 
6.2 Other robustness tests  
To ensure that the result is not limited to the conditions set in the model, we perform several 
robustness tests. We change the definition of the local dummy from quintile to quartile. The local 
dummy equals one if the mean distance between the three largest institutions and the firms is less 
than the first quartile, and it equals zero if the mean distance is in the lower quartile. The result is 
in Table 12 (Panel A). 
In October 2000, the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was implemented to prevent listed 
companies from disclosing selective information. Bernile et al. (2014) suggest that the 
informational advantages for local institutional investors has declined after the adoption of Reg 
FD. In a subsequent article, Bernile et al. (2016) further validate their previous findings and argue 
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for a local information advantage decline after the year 2000. Huang & Kang (2017) contend that 
the spatial concentration of institutional investors mitigates the information asymmetry of the firms 
and that the concentration increases monitoring effectiveness. They only include observations after 
the implementation of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (October 2000) to confirm that institutional 
shareholders’ geographic concentration is a cause of better corporate governance instead of the 
information advantage that is used to better-performing stocks. Hence, we limit the samples to post 
2000 in Panel B.  
Next, since we believe that local institutions use various approaches to receive private and 
soft information and since technology firms are regarded as better at acquiring all kinds of 
information, we use only the technology firms for the robustness test. Following Barton & 
Waymire (2004) and Laitinen (2002) we use the 3-digit SIC code3 to sort out technology firms 
samples. The results are in Panel C.  
The results in Table 12 are robust to all the changes, especially the Antitakeover Index. The 
signs of the coefficients for the local dummy in the regression of AI and BC are continuously 
opposite, with negative coefficients in the AI regression and positive coefficients in the BC 
regression. These results are consistent with our findings in Table 7.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this thesis, we have investigated the effect of geographic proximity between institutional 
investors and firms on corporate governance. It is documented by the scholars that compared to 
                         
3
 We define technology firms as those in the following industries: computer equipment (357), software (737), medical 
technology (38, 873), communication (36, 481, 489), electrical work (173), and other (261, 286, 287, 289, 34, 351-356, 358-359, 
371-373, 482, 491, 493, 781, 762, 871). 
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the non-local investors, the locals have the information advantage, which can help them to monitor 
the firms more effectively and efficiently. Moreover, we have further studied the different impacts 
by dividing corporate governance into internal and external two kinds. For the best of our 
knowledge, this thesis is the first study to investigate the relationship between local investors and 
corporate governance on internal and external level. We also provide evidence for the substitution 
theory between internal and external governance while studying the firms with local institutional 
investors. 
The results demonstrate that the firms with local investors have weaker board of directors but, 
comparatively, superior external governance, especially in the antitakeover measure use. In our 
study, there is a clear pattern for the substitution relationship between internal and external 
governance because the coefficients of the internal and external indices always have opposite signs. 
This substitute effect is even stronger in the firms with a smaller size and a lower cash ratio. The 
reason for the weak internal governance could be that institutions can affect local firms’ decisions 
through their personal relationships with the executive team of the firms since the local investors 
have more opportunities to build connections with the managers in business and other kinds of 
occasions. Plus, the threat from the market for corporate control to take over the firms also gives 
the managers a good amount of stress to operate the firms well. We also studied using individual 
governance mechanisms to have a closer look at the influence of local investors on corporate 
governance. The results again support the substitution relationship.  
There are several aspects of future investigation. First, a more apparent distinction and better 
proxies of external and internal governance might improve the research accuracy. Second, more 
updated data in geographic proximity would enable the results to capture the evolving trends. 
Lastly, a more effective model can be used to tackle the endogeneity problem. 
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Distance (in 100s of 
miles) 






Board Size CEO Duality Dual Class Staggered Board 
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean mean mean median mean median mean median mean median mean median 
1993 12.154 12.535 8.769 9 1.308 1 1.769 1 . . . . . . . . 0.462 0 0.154 0 
1995 11.501 13.596 8.483 8 1.172 1 1.552 1 . . . . . . . . 0.414 0 0.138 0 
1996 12.589 14.303 . . . . . . 1.562 1 0.535 0.519 9.25 9 0.562 1 . . . . 
1997 10.895 7.96 . . . . . . 1.672 2 0.577 0.571 9.082 9 0.59 1 . . . . 
1998 13.5 15.239 7.603 7 1.052 1 1.466 1 1.789 2 0.57 0.571 8.561 8 0.807 1 0.397 0 0.19 0 
1999 12.393 13.609 . . . . . . 1.392 1 0.601 0.625 8.679 8 0.804 1 . . . . 
2000 12.933 14.885 8.493 8 1.442 1 2 2 1.792 2 0.61 0.636 8.641 8 0.788 1 0.521 1 0.126 0 
2001 13.762 16.596 . . . . . . 1.665 2 0.633 0.667 8.259 8 0.778 1 . . . . 
2002 13.709 15.801 8.688 9 1.762 2 2.123 2 1.635 2 0.651 0.667 8.374 8 0.831 1 0.565 1 0.115 0 
2003 12.914 14.475 . . . . . . 1.603 2 0.689 0.714 8.444 8 0.782 1 . . . . 
2004 13.211 15.754 8.785 9 1.774 2 2.222 2 1.525 1 0.708 0.714 8.711 8.5 0.77 1 0.567 1 0.088 0 
2005 12.842 14.787 . . . . . . 1.34 1 0.724 0.75 8.684 9 0.709 1 . . . . 
2006 13.539 16.728 8.61 8.5 1.649 2 2.058 2 1.386 1 0.727 0.75 8.943 9 0.642 1 0.516 1 0.101 0 
2007 13.538 16.879 8.49 8 1.31 1 3.957 4 1.337 1 0.764 0.8 8.423 8 0.669 1 0.524 1 0.08 0 
2008 12.917 15.092 8.732 9 1.276 1 3.842 4 1.395 1 0.766 0.778 8.698 8 0.707 1 0.543 1 0.081 0 
2009 13.3 16.388 8.777 9 1.231 1 3.604 4 1.364 1 0.771 0.8 8.671 9 0.676 1 0.511 1 0.076 0 
2010 13.2 16.69 8.783 9 1.184 1 4.067 4 1.361 1 0.779 0.8 8.568 8 0.705 1 0.491 0 0.064 0 
2011 12.927 15.104 8.742 9 1.171 1 3.648 4 1.275 1 0.785 0.8 8.826 9 0.575 1 0.456 0 0.07 0 
2012 12.625 13.765 8.781 9 1.14 1 3.57 4 1.245 1 0.794 0.818 8.969 9 0.598 1 0.416 0 0.052 0 
2013 12.515 11.671 9.01 9 1.082 1 3.44 3 1.336 1 0.8 0.833 9.101 9 0.616 1 0.392 0 0.06 0 
2014 12.989 15.367 8.851 9 1.05 1 3.382 3 1.231 1 0.791 0.818 9.118 9 0.576 1 0.315 0 0.071 0 












ROA MB Fixed Asset Ratio Leverage Ratio Bad Z-Score Firm Age Firm Risk 
mean median mean median mean median mean median mean mean median mean median median mean median mean median mean median mean median 
1993 0.17 0.145 0.172 0.152 6.766 6.75 0.132 0.097 0.074 0.064 1.611 1.333 0.273 0.25 0.169 0.147 0 0 15.615 20 2.564 2.715 
1995 0.158 0.132 0.127 0.049 6.889 7.147 0.114 0.082 0.073 0.06 1.456 1.303 0.29 0.266 0.184 0.157 0.034 0 20.517 22 2.44 2.406 
1996 0.176 0.142 0.182 0.048 6.792 6.876 0.147 0.11 0.092 0.082 2.262 1.233 0.272 0.228 0.177 0.17 0.031 0 24.031 23 2.452 2.363 
1997 0.175 0.159 0.108 0.039 6.709 6.55 0.043 0.074 0.045 0.057 1.511 1.23 0.28 0.237 0.211 0.207 0.016 0 24.393 24 2.493 2.343 
1998 0.213 0.188 0.162 0.054 6.572 6.435 0.097 0.098 0.045 0.056 2.135 1.53 0.301 0.217 0.194 0.168 0.017 0 19.15 13.5 2.606 2.526 
1999 0.198 0.184 0.178 0.079 6.835 6.77 0.09 0.087 0.039 0.065 2.319 1.542 0.284 0.219 0.22 0.191 0.017 0 19.042 14 2.892 2.950 
2000 0.193 0.175 0.199 0.082 6.896 6.813 0.131 0.121 0.052 0.057 3.148 1.842 0.265 0.212 0.239 0.212 0.036 0 17.19 11 2.986 3.013 
2001 0.201 0.18 0.213 0.097 6.924 6.807 0.181 0.146 0.038 0.061 2.66 1.534 0.247 0.184 0.219 0.172 0.084 0 17.326 11 3.344 3.344 
2002 0.205 0.189 0.246 0.159 6.862 6.75 -0.032 0.046 -0.011 0.032 2.226 1.71 0.237 0.182 0.208 0.173 0.059 0 17.14 11 3.127 3.128 
2003 0.198 0.183 0.229 0.149 7.046 6.972 -0.036 0.011 0.02 0.038 1.619 1.285 0.255 0.194 0.188 0.162 0.046 0 19.632 13 2.939 2.873 
2004 0.182 0.162 0.267 0.194 6.988 6.924 0.074 0.091 0.014 0.042 2.068 1.65 0.222 0.153 0.208 0.202 0.026 0 18.881 12 2.595 2.590 
2005 0.223 0.214 0.232 0.181 7.263 7.16 0.148 0.133 0.064 0.063 2.022 1.599 0.235 0.157 0.175 0.165 0.028 0 21.393 14 2.364 2.354 
2006 0.23 0.214 0.234 0.169 7.195 7.068 0.109 0.107 0.054 0.059 2.159 1.622 0.23 0.15 0.199 0.165 0.047 0 19.399 13 2.324 2.301 
2007 0.243 0.213 0.245 0.207 7.216 7.121 0.122 0.111 0.044 0.054 2.112 1.642 0.207 0.147 0.167 0.132 0.026 0 18.352 13 2.328 2.314 
2008 0.257 0.235 0.225 0.172 7.299 7.25 0.104 0.097 0.052 0.058 2.012 1.485 0.203 0.132 0.18 0.158 0.039 0 19.185 13 2.402 2.386 
2009 0.266 0.264 0.212 0.168 7.177 7.041 0.05 0.079 -0.001 0.048 1.39 1.116 0.201 0.138 0.184 0.155 0.047 0 20.32 15 3.178 3.119 
2010 0.239 0.218 0.243 0.223 7.156 7.017 -0.099 -0.047 0.027 0.04 1.607 1.343 0.205 0.121 0.155 0.117 0.038 0 21.367 16 2.84 2.806 
2011 0.237 0.218 0.227 0.202 7.337 7.249 0.117 0.102 0.067 0.065 1.844 1.492 0.211 0.133 0.165 0.126 0.028 0 23.439 17 2.373 2.344 
2012 0.253 0.241 0.201 0.146 7.612 7.527 0.098 0.097 0.067 0.064 1.674 1.355 0.226 0.14 0.18 0.151 0.035 0 24.779 19 2.57 2.548 
2013 0.262 0.261 0.2 0.155 7.783 7.645 0.039 0.052 0.06 0.056 1.694 1.326 0.213 0.133 0.188 0.161 0.017 0 26.11 20 2.23 2.218 
2014 0.272 0.266 0.201 0.173 7.802 7.744 0.039 0.057 0.052 0.056 2.048 1.603 0.226 0.139 0.197 0.178 0.023 0 27.353 21 2.13 2.035 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N mean median sd min max 
Distance (in 100 of miles) 4,502 13.04 15.25 7.345 1.739 23.68 
GIM-Index 2,830 8.698 9 2.488 1 17 
Antitakeover Index 3,139 1.335 1 0.877 0 3 
Entrenchment Index 3,139 3.089 3 1.366 0 6 
Board Characteristics 3,996 1.435 1 0.838 0 5 
Board Independence 3,996 0.721 0.75 0.155 0.2 0.923 
Board Size 3,996 8.716 9 2.173 5 18 
CEO Duality 3,996 0.696 1 0.46 0 1 
Dual Class 3,139 0.481 0 0.5 0 1 
Staggered Board 3,139 0.084 0 0.278 0 1 
Blockholder Ownership (%) 4,502 0.228 0.211 0.127 0.051 0.632 
Cash Ratio 4,502 0.219 0.155 0.207 0 0.899 
Size (log(Total Asset), million) 4,502 7.202 7.06 1.396 3.12 11.29 
Sales Growth Ratio 4,502 0.070 0.085 0.216 -1.126 0.704 
ROA 4,502 0.041 0.055 0.122 -0.986 0.307 
MB 4,502 2.013 1.473 1.696 0.149 11.69 
Fixed Asset Ratio 4,502 0.231 0.16 0.202 0 0.888 
Leverage Ratio 4,502 0.191 0.161 0.186 0 0.989 
Bad Z-Score 4,502 0.036 0 0.187 0 1 
Firm Age 4,502 20.87 15 17.44 0 88 
Firm Risk 4,502 2.645 2.561 0.613 1.537 4.458 
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Non-local  Local  
Equality Tests 
(P-value) 
   N Mean Median  N Mean Median  T-test Wilcoxon 
GIM-Index 1,449 8.292 8  945 9.061 9  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Antitakeover 
Index 
1,597 1.329 1  1,039 1.317 1  0.727 0.953 
Entrenchment 
Index 
1,597 2.974 3  1,039 3.242 3  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Board 
Characteristics 
2,015 1.361 1  1,297 1.513 2  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Board 
Independence 
2,015 0.722 0.75  1,297 0.72 0.75  0.673 0.5524 
Board Size 2,015 8.229 8  1,297 9.281 9  0.000*** 0.000*** 
CEO Duality 2,015 0.668 1  1,297 0.72 1  0.002*** 0.002*** 
Dual Class 1,597 0.433 0  1,039 0.541 1  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Staggered 
Board 
1,597 0.042 0  1,039 0.14 0  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Blockholder 
Ownership (%) 
2,317 0.234 0.217  1,428 0.223 0.202  0.015** 0.002*** 
Cash Ratio 2,317 0.275 0.243  1,428 0.16 0.096  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Size  2,317 7.079 6.922  1,428 7.386 7.331  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sales Growth 
Ratio 
2,317 0.074 0.093  1,428 0.069 0.075  0.503 0.007*** 
ROA 2,317 0.032 0.053  1,428 0.057 0.06  0.000*** 0.000*** 
MB 2,317 2.172 1.574  1,428 1.882 1.442  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Fixed Asset 
Ratio 
2,317 0.213 0.129  1,428 0.241 0.196  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Leverage Ratio 2,317 0.166 0.106  1,428 0.217 0.205  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bad Z-Score 2,317 0.035 0  1,428 0.046 0  0.073* 0.073* 
Firm Age 2,317 17.52 14  1,428 25.1 18  0.000*** 0.000*** 
Firm Risk 2,317 2.756 2.681  1,428 2.474 2.408  0.000*** 0.000*** 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significant differences between the local and non-local at the 1%, 5 %, and 
10% levels, respectively. Differences in means (medians) are tested using t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests). 
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Table 4: Correlation Coefficients 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Distance (1) 1                     
GIM-Index (2) -0.173*** 1                    
Antitakeover 
Index 
(3) -0.008 0.373*** 1                   
Entrenchment 
Index 
(4) -0.091*** 0.453*** 0.374*** 1                  
Board 
Characteristics 
(5) -0.097*** 0.033 0.039** -0.112*** 1                 
Board 
Independence 
(6) 0.016 0.184*** -0.036* 0.322*** -0.468*** 1                
Board Size (7) -0.237*** 0.333*** 0.024 0.110*** 0.260*** 0.125*** 1               
CEO Duality (8) -0.062*** 0.088*** 0.032* -0.051*** 0.576*** -0.019 0.073*** 1              
Dual Class (9) -0.109*** 0.359*** 0.623*** 0.445*** 0.054*** -0.063*** 0.011 0.021 1             
Staggered 
Board 
(10) -0.158*** -0.201*** -0.133*** -0.194*** 0.173*** -0.266*** 0.009 0.066*** -0.076*** 1            
Blockholder 
Ownership (%) 
(11) 0.032** -0.052*** -0.030* 0.153*** -0.170*** 0.141*** -0.184*** -0.089*** 0.038** 0.028 1           
Cash Ratio (12) 0.289*** -0.153*** 0.035* -0.037** -0.121*** 0.008 -0.365*** -0.104*** 0.007 -0.037** 0.076*** 1          
Size (log (AT), 
million) 
(13) -0.093*** 0.211*** -0.116*** 0.063*** 0.097*** 0.244*** 0.575*** 0.101*** -0.150*** -0.006 -0.220*** -0.309*** 1         
Sales Growth 
Ratio 
(14) 0.023 0.01 0.003 -0.034* 0.047*** -0.093*** -0.005 -0.001 0.027 0.008 -0.065*** -0.004 0.037** 1        
ROA (15) -0.070*** 0.066*** -0.082*** 0.037** 0.034** 0.01 0.039** 0.046*** -0.002 -0.016 -0.085*** -0.091*** 0.119*** 0.269*** 1       
MB (16) 0.106*** -0.084*** 0.040** -0.109*** 0.002 -0.097*** -0.211*** 0.021 -0.011 0.003 -0.068*** 0.411*** -0.177*** 0.262*** 0.212*** 1      
Fixed Asset 
Ratio 
(17) -0.106*** 0.109*** 0.024 0.003 0.122*** -0.015 0.251*** 0.120*** 0.036** -0.033* -0.117*** -0.445*** 0.231*** -0.034** 0.033** -0.184*** 1     
Leverage Ratio (18) -0.161*** 0.081*** 0.007 -0.031* 0.070*** 0.01 0.291*** 0.086*** -0.025 0.045** -0.026* -0.346*** 0.291*** 0 -0.163*** -0.133*** 0.317*** 1    
Bad Z-Score (19) -0.024 -0.012 -0.018 -0.022 0.033** 0.037** 0.142*** 0.021 -0.047*** -0.003 -0.031** -0.089*** 0.132*** -0.046*** -0.154*** -0.108*** 0.142*** 0.183*** 1   
Firm Age (20) -0.207*** 0.330*** -0.049*** 0.101*** 0.028* 0.212*** 0.428*** 0.080*** -0.151*** -0.071*** -0.147*** -0.301*** 0.461*** -0.106*** 0.075*** -0.209*** 0.275*** 0.148*** 0.052*** 1  
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Table 5: OLS Regression Analysis for the Non-matched Samples 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 




 External Governance Index 
 Internal Governance 
Index 
VARIABLES GIM Index  Antitakeover Index  Entrenchment Index  Board Characteristics 
Local Dummy 0.223** 1.603*  0.020 -0.738**  0.140*** -0.379  0.131*** 0.530** 
 
(0.025) (0.064)  (0.556) (0.016)  (0.001) (0.334)  (0.000) (0.035) 
Block. Own * Local Dummy  -2.742***   0.038   -0.391   -0.056 
 
 (0.000)   (0.880)   (0.225)   (0.794) 
Cash Ratio * Local Dummy  0.734   0.879***   0.985***   -0.212 
 
 (0.153)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.163) 











 (0.096)   (0.020)   (0.780)   (0.002) 
Sales Growth Ratio * Local 








 (0.544)   (0.391)   (0.309)   (0.293) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  -0.008   -0.001   0.008***   0.005*** 
  (0.203)   (0.632)   (0.004)   (0.009) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  0.094   0.047   0.061   0.022 
  (0.583)   (0.446)   (0.442)   (0.655) 












(0.270) (0.001)  (0.698) (0.651)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Ratio -0.050 -0.273  0.156 -0.164  0.230* -0.139  -0.118 -0.048 
 
(0.869) (0.435)  (0.148) (0.191)  (0.096) (0.388)  (0.201) (0.660) 
Size 0.044 0.096*  -0.039*** -0.064***  -0.044** -0.043*  0.066*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.300) (0.069)  (0.007) (0.000)  (0.017) (0.068)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth Ratio 0.092 0.205  0.045 -0.006  0.026 -0.062  0.128* 0.072 
 
(0.672) (0.439)  (0.568) (0.950)  (0.798) (0.624)  (0.066) (0.387) 
ROA 0.438 0.370  -0.410*** -0.362**  -0.207 -0.142  0.050 0.031 
 
(0.267) (0.355)  (0.006) (0.017)  (0.280) (0.465)  (0.708) (0.821) 
MB -0.048 -0.042  -0.007 -0.004  -0.035** -0.035**  0.009 0.008 
 
(0.181) (0.237)  (0.571) (0.751)  (0.027) (0.031)  (0.356) (0.419) 
Fixed Asset Ratio 0.212 0.202  0.404*** 0.392***  0.679*** 0.663***  0.364*** 0.358*** 
 
(0.579) (0.596)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage Ratio -0.220 -0.226  -0.084 -0.065  0.014 0.035  -0.181** -0.175* 
 
(0.438) (0.427)  (0.417) (0.534)  (0.915) (0.791)  (0.043) (0.050) 
Bad Z-Score -0.179 -0.128  -0.100 -0.086  0.000 0.015  0.108 0.115 
 
(0.456) (0.593)  (0.275) (0.346)  (0.998) (0.901)  (0.167) (0.142) 
Firm Age 0.038*** 0.043***  -0.002 -0.001  -0.000 -0.005**  -0.001 -0.004** 











 (0.069) (0.109)  (0.449) (0.210)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.808) (0.989) 
Constant 9.569*** 8.897***  0.270 0.750  0.971 1.485  1.116 0.957 
 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.753) (0.388)  (0.376) (0.182)  (0.168) (0.242) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 2,781 2,781  3,078 3,078  3,078 3,078  3,932 3,932 
Adj. R-squared / Pseudo R-







P-value > F / Chi2 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table 6: OLS & Logit Regression Analyses for the Non-matched Individual Mechanism Samples 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 OLS  Logit 
VARIABLES 









  Staggered Board 
Local Dummy 
-
0.014*** -0.079*  0.466*** 0.431  0.134 0.897  1.505*** 2.896*  0.495*** -0.806 
 (0.003) (0.053)  (0.000) (0.399)  (0.117) (0.241)  (0.000) (0.087)  (0.000) (0.330) 
Block. Own * Local Dummy  0.011   -0.492   -0.180   1.325   -1.350** 
  (0.751)   (0.263)   (0.777)   (0.335)   (0.047) 
Cash Ratio * Local Dummy  -0.049**   0.196   -1.019**   0.941   2.477*** 
 
 (0.047)   (0.526)   (0.020)   (0.302)   (0.000) 
Size * Local Dummy  0.010***   
-
0.150***   
-
0.187***   -0.334**   0.126* 
 
 (0.009)   (0.001)   (0.007)   (0.022)   (0.086) 
Sales Growth Ratio * Local 
Dummy  -0.018   0.314   0.011   -0.523   0.107 
  (0.392)   (0.229)   (0.977)   (0.487)   (0.792) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  0.000   0.008**   0.032***   0.045**   0.011* 
  (0.328)   (0.039)   (0.000)   (0.013)   (0.089) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  -0.001   0.387***   0.067   -0.047   -0.013 
  (0.893)   (0.000)   (0.658)   (0.884)   (0.940) 
Blockholder Ownership (%) 0.131*** 0.130***  -0.465** -0.252  -0.274 -0.108  1.485** 0.678  0.219 0.891* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.042) (0.411)  (0.401) (0.803)  (0.016) (0.564)  (0.532) (0.062) 
Cash Ratio 






0.681*** -0.355  0.284 -0.193  0.407 -0.475 
 (0.159) (0.027)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.009) (0.246)  (0.602) (0.806)  (0.154) (0.160) 
Size 





 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth Ratio 
-
0.032*** -0.025*  0.191 0.073  -0.157 -0.204  -0.235 -0.001  0.271 0.228 
 (0.005) (0.063)  (0.178) (0.666)  (0.441) (0.403)  (0.540) (0.998)  (0.200) (0.393) 
ROA -0.007 -0.006  -0.425 -0.503*  0.857** 0.816**  -0.853 -0.843  0.145 0.340 
 (0.765) (0.772)  (0.120) (0.067)  (0.020) (0.029)  (0.200) (0.223)  (0.713) (0.401) 
MB 





 (0.296) (0.420)  (0.207) (0.402)  (0.015) (0.043)  (0.643) (0.766)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Fixed Asset Ratio -0.003 -0.001  0.175 0.113  0.273 0.281  0.099 0.207  1.705*** 1.708*** 
 (0.877) (0.943)  (0.450) (0.624)  (0.430) (0.420)  (0.878) (0.747)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage Ratio 0.015 0.011  0.594*** 0.627***  -0.202 -0.202  -0.291 -0.209  -0.688** -0.654** 
 (0.308) (0.435)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.442) (0.446)  (0.558) (0.678)  (0.014) (0.021) 
Bad Z-Score 0.008 0.005  0.372** 0.386**  0.158 0.150  0.285 0.253  -0.594** -0.575** 
 (0.537) (0.668)  (0.019) (0.015)  (0.504) (0.527)  (0.576) (0.630)  (0.017) (0.022) 
Firm Age 




















0.521***  -0.024 -0.061  0.245 0.190  -0.047 -0.072 
 (0.002) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.811) (0.609)  (0.215) (0.512)  (0.668) (0.592) 




7.171***  0.867 1.153 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.200) (0.110)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.336) (0.243) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 3,936 3,936  3,932 3,932  3,878 3,878  2,652 2,652  3,005 3,005 
Adj. R-squared / Pseudo R-
squared 








P-value > F / Chi2 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  
General Governance 
Index 
 External Governance Index  
Internal Governance 
Index 
VARIABLES GIM Index  Antitakeover Index  Entrenchment Index  Board Characteristics 
Local Dummy 0.234** 1.355  0.041 -0.880**  0.147*** -0.625  0.178*** 0.510* 
 
(0.039) (0.181)  (0.284) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.163)  (0.000) (0.079) 
Block. Own * Local Dummy  -2.865***   -0.074   -0.506   0.006 
 
 (0.000)   (0.794)   (0.165)   (0.981) 
Cash Ratio * Local Dummy  0.671   0.934***   1.042***   -0.293* 
 
 (0.251)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.083) 
Size * Local Dummy  -0.065   0.102***   0.058   -0.064** 
 
 (0.473)   (0.001)   (0.145)   (0.016) 
Sales Growth Ratio * Local 








 (0.172)   (0.731)   (0.890)   (0.710) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  -0.015**   -0.003   0.007**   0.005*** 
  (0.032)   (0.256)   (0.023)   (0.007) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  0.098   0.020   0.037   0.024 
  (0.624)   (0.779)   (0.682)   (0.674) 
Blockholder Ownership (%) 0.343 1.725***  0.028 0.064  0.564*** 0.847***  -0.564*** -0.561*** 
 
(0.411) (0.003)  (0.848) (0.752)  (0.003) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Cash Ratio -0.146 -0.448  0.064 -0.318**  -0.003 -0.449**  -0.188** -0.078 
 
(0.652) (0.270)  (0.562) (0.022)  (0.984) (0.012)  (0.044) (0.514) 
Size 0.094* 0.114*  -0.029* -0.071***  -0.032 -0.050*  0.070*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.055) (0.072)  (0.071) (0.001)  (0.129) (0.066)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth Ratio -0.095 0.270  -0.036 -0.045  -0.070 -0.071  0.228*** 0.190* 
 
(0.713) (0.428)  (0.697) (0.721)  (0.559) (0.661)  (0.005) (0.071) 
Firm Age 0.033*** 0.043***  -0.003** -0.002  -0.002 -0.007***  -0.001 -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.014) (0.424)  (0.187) (0.007)  (0.174) (0.004) 
Firm Risk -0.282** -0.317**  -0.011 -0.032  -0.129** -0.168**  0.030 0.019 
 (0.024) (0.046)  (0.797) (0.559)  (0.025) (0.018)  (0.416) (0.677) 
Constant 5.298** 5.103**  2.809*** 3.227***  3.822*** 4.295***  2.076*** 1.921*** 
 
(0.024) (0.032)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.002) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
PSM YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 2,082 2,082  2,410 2,410  2,410 2,410  3,096 3,096 
Adj. R-squared  0.219 0.226  0.128 0.137  0.406 0.411  0.116 0.118 
P-value > F  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table 8: OLS & Logit Regression Analyses for the PSM Matched Individual Mechanism Samples 
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
 OLS  Logit 
VARIABLES Board Independence  Board Size  CEO Duality  Dual Class  Staggered Board 
Local Dummy -0.015*** -0.127***  0.520*** -0.093  0.255** 0.776  1.544*** 2.226  0.546*** -1.788* 
 (0.004) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.877)  (0.023) (0.473)  (0.000) (0.269)  (0.000) (0.063) 












  (0.472)   (0.890)   (0.900)   (0.259)   (0.110) 












  (0.017)   (0.442)   (0.024)   (0.097)   (0.000) 











  (0.004)   (0.068)   (0.302)   (0.187)   (0.002) 












  (0.504)   (0.293)   (0.599)   (0.589)   (0.537) 
Firm Age*Local 
Dummy 
 -0.000   0.008*   0.028***   0.031   0.002 
  (0.992)   (0.074)   (0.000)   (0.112)   (0.738) 
Firm Risk*Local 
Dummy 
 0.011   0.432***   -0.049   -0.148   0.063 
  (0.225)   (0.000)   (0.821)   (0.700)   (0.742) 
Blockholder 
Ownership (%) 
0.129*** 0.119***  -0.369 -0.355  -0.578 -0.558  1.343* -0.080  0.475 1.161** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.158) (0.329)  (0.177) (0.347)  (0.052) (0.956)  (0.228) (0.037) 
Cash Ratio 0.023 0.055***  -1.090*** -1.236***  -0.438 0.088  0.148 -1.116  -0.103 -1.170*** 
 (0.131) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.173) (0.830)  (0.781) (0.246)  (0.724) (0.002) 
Size 0.017*** 0.011***  0.685*** 0.730***  0.140*** 0.190***  0.117 0.271*  -0.122*** -0.226*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.002)  (0.186) (0.060)  (0.006) (0.000) 
Sales Growth Ratio -0.041*** -0.033*  0.149 0.014  0.339 0.428  -0.411 -0.831  0.302 0.512 
 (0.002) (0.052)  (0.375) (0.950)  (0.233) (0.257)  (0.350) (0.310)  (0.225) (0.140) 
Firm Age 0.001*** 0.001**  0.011*** 0.008**  0.003 -0.014**  -0.029*** -0.054***  -0.031*** -0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.027)  (0.000) (0.024)  (0.512) (0.014)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Risk -0.016*** -0.021***  -0.270*** -0.468***  -0.266* -0.245  0.283 0.305  -0.134 -0.203 
 (0.006) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.056) (0.157)  (0.195) (0.379)  (0.272) (0.188) 
Constant 0.381*** 0.436***  4.779*** 5.217***  1.195 0.879  -5.225*** -5.447***  0.813 1.618 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.353) (0.527)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.427) (0.156) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
PSM YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 3,096 3,096  3,096 3,096  2,196 2,196  2,034 2,034  2,298 2,298 
Adj.R-squared / 
Pseudo R-squared 
0.319 0.322  0.425 0.429  0.107 0.117  0.221 0.228  0.123 0.133 
P-value>F / Chi2 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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 Table 9: The Relationship Between External and Internal Governance 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GIM Index  Antitakeover Index  Entrenchment Index 
Board Characteristics 0.052 0.105  0.009 0.003  -0.012 -0.047 
 (0.485) (0.238)  (0.708) (0.927)  (0.708) (0.219) 
Board Characteristics * Local Dummy 
 
-0.086   0.011  
 
0.058* 
  (0.283)   (0.667)   (0.083) 
Blockholder Ownership (%) 0.600 0.557  0.144 0.149  0.776*** 0.801*** 
 (0.239) (0.276)  (0.383) (0.369)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Ratio 0.227 0.155  0.059 0.065  0.003 0.035 
 (0.567) (0.700)  (0.634) (0.602)  (0.986) (0.831) 
Size 0.047 0.031  -0.036** -0.035*  -0.039 -0.032 
 (0.417) (0.606)  (0.043) (0.052)  (0.102) (0.175) 
Sales Growth Ratio -0.235 -0.241  0.017 0.018  -0.068 -0.061 
 (0.465) (0.452)  (0.872) (0.862)  (0.619) (0.655) 
Firm Age 0.034*** 0.035***  -0.003** -0.003**  -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.459) (0.321) 
Firm Risk -0.631*** -0.641***  -0.054 -0.052  -0.181*** -0.174** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.298) (0.312)  (0.008) (0.011) 
Constant 6.213*** 6.392***  2.841*** 2.814***  5.750*** 5.605*** 
 (0.007) (0.006)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
PSM YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 1,466 1,466  1,816 1,816  1,816 1,816 
Adj. R-squared  0.252 0.252  0.145 0.145  0.392 0.393 
P-value > F  0 0  0 0  0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
 - 43 - 
Table 10: Logit Regression Analysis for Causality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GIM Index 0.093***    
 (0.000)    
Antitakeover Index  0.021   
 
 (0.632)   
Entrenchment Index   0.125***  
 
  (0.000)  
Board Characteristics    0.191*** 
 
   (0.000) 
Blockholder Ownership (%) -0.193 -0.383 -0.626** -0.290 
 (0.570) (0.220) (0.049) (0.302) 
Cash Ratio -3.335*** -2.536*** -2.581*** -2.137*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.195*** -0.142*** -0.151*** -0.152*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth Ratio 0.030 0.082 0.106 -0.053 
 (0.894) (0.700) (0.622) (0.768) 
Firm Age 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Risk -0.416*** -0.431*** -0.408*** -0.529*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.931*** 2.213*** 1.937*** 2.194*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,830 3,139 3,139 3,996 
Pseudo R-squared  0.114 0.0781 0.0825 0.0836 
P-value > F 0 0 0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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Table 11: 2SLS Regression Analysis 






















Remote Dummy -0.661***  -0.599***  -0.599***  -0.591***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Metropolitan Dummy -0.376***  -0.357***  -0.357***  -0.340***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Local Dummy  -0.454  0.181  0.294*  0.126 
  (0.152)  (0.131)  (0.056)  (0.233) 
Blockholder Ownership (%) -0.073 0.299 -0.124* -0.004 -0.124* 0.649*** -0.120** -0.696*** 
 (0.278) (0.412) (0.060) (0.977) (0.060) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) 
Cash Ratio -0.506*** -0.598* -0.407*** 0.154 -0.407*** 0.068 -0.356*** -0.132 
 (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.632) (0.000) (0.150) 
Size -0.036*** 0.000 -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.026*** -0.041** -0.025*** 0.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.993) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth Ratio -0.029 0.075 -0.032 -0.017 -0.032 -0.060 -0.037 0.139** 
 (0.454) (0.718) (0.418) (0.820) (0.418) (0.538) (0.289) (0.033) 
Firm Age 0.004*** 0.041*** 0.004*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.805) (0.000) (0.451) 
Firm Risk -0.072*** -0.317*** -0.066*** 0.009 -0.066*** -0.134*** -0.088*** 0.006 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.824) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.856) 
Constant 1.707*** 6.776*** 1.641*** 0.347 1.641*** 1.302 1.718*** 0.937 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.693) (0.000) (0.247) (0.000) (0.253) 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,781 2,781 3,078 3,078 3,078 3,078 3,932 3,932 
Adj. R-squared  0.346 0.214 0.301 0.125 0.301 0.415 0.291 0.114 
P-value > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P-values in parentheses, *** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1 
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 Table 12: Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A: Using First and Last Quartiles as Local Dummy 
 General Governance 
Index 
 External Governance Index  
Internal Governance 
Index 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 










 (0.039) (0.220)  (0.284) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.153)  (0.000) (0.068) 
Block. own* Local Dummy  -2.851***   -0.074   -0.504   0.004 
  (0.000)   (0.793)   (0.167)   (0.988) 
Cash Ratio *Local Dummy  0.659   0.934***   1.041***   -0.291* 
  (0.259)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.085) 
Size*Local Dummy  -0.061   0.102***   0.059   -0.064** 
  (0.503)   (0.001)   (0.141)   (0.015) 
Sales Growth Ratio*Local Dummy  -0.666   0.060   0.032   0.056 
  (0.178)   (0.732)   (0.888)   (0.712) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  -0.014**   -0.003   0.007**   0.005*** 
  (0.034)   (0.256)   (0.023)   (0.008) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  0.132   0.019   0.041   0.019 
  (0.499)   (0.783)   (0.649)   (0.731) 
            




 External Governance Index  
Internal Governance 
Index 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 










 (0.127) (0.252)  (0.099) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.110)  (0.000) (0.015) 
Block. own* Local Dummy  -2.809***   0.071   -0.605   -0.039 
  (0.001)   (0.805)   (0.105)   (0.878) 
Cash Ratio *Local Dummy  0.732   1.030***   1.230***   -0.225 
  (0.224)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.205) 
Size*Local Dummy  -0.039   0.096***   0.049   -0.082*** 
  (0.681)   (0.002)   (0.229)   (0.003) 
Sales Growth Ratio*Local Dummy  -0.484   -0.117   -0.074   0.052 
  (0.347)   (0.513)   (0.751)   (0.744) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  -0.013*   -0.001   0.009***   0.007*** 
  (0.061)   (0.745)   (0.006)   (0.002) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  0.026   0.066   0.086   -0.031 
  (0.899)   (0.358)   (0.356)   (0.607) 
            




 External Governance Index  
Internal Governance 
Index 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
VARIABLES GIM Index  Antitakeover Index  Entrenchment Index  Board Characteristics 
Local Dummy 0.007 -2.056  0.039 -2.040***  0.127* -1.878***  0.244*** 0.287 
 (0.968) (0.188)  (0.490) (0.000)  (0.075) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.501) 
Block. own* Local Dummy  -0.897   0.862*   0.595   -0.218 
  (0.476)   (0.051)   (0.281)   (0.551) 
Cash Ratio *Local Dummy  3.016***   1.321***   1.586***   -0.289 
  (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.259) 
Size*Local Dummy  0.078   0.224***   0.166***   -0.037 
  (0.566)   (0.000)   (0.005)   (0.328) 
Sales Growth Ratio*Local Dummy  -0.249   -0.078   0.127   0.024 
  (0.755)   (0.772)   (0.709)   (0.910) 
Firm Age*Local Dummy  0.000   -0.001   0.012***   0.005* 
  (0.973)   (0.847)   (0.006)   (0.071) 
Firm Risk*Local Dummy  0.422   -0.004   0.015   0.080 
  (0.162)   (0.972)   (0.908)   (0.320) 
